

SECTION FOUR

Architectures of Memory



12 Value of Memory – Memory of Value: A Mnemonic Interpretation of Socrates' Ethical Intellectualism

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I should be able to tell you the story – I've practiced it enough.

– Plato, *The Symposium*¹

1. Is Memory a Value?

Sigmund Freud, while arguing that he had successfully resolved the paradoxes of Socratic ethical intellectualism, also stressed strong connections between evaluation and memory. According to his early dream theory, people tend to remember what is good (or pleasurable) and to forget what is bad (or painful).² Thus, evaluation is what sets apart conscious and subconscious memory, and the recognition of good and bad shapes our memory in fundamental ways. Yet, Freud only reminds us of what Plato had previously demonstrated: the strong connection between memory and evaluation, such that it even clouds the real difference between these two spheres. Hence, we ask: 'Is memory a value?' or 'Is value a memory?'

In this paper, these questions take the shape of a more specific question: What is the relation between Socrates' theory of value and his approach to memory? In answering it, we investigate three basic Platonic images of memory: as wax tablet, as aviary, and as a garment we wear. The problem of Socratic ethical intellectualism is essential to this discussion because it foregrounds Plato's understanding of the relation between memory and value.

2. Contradictions of Socratic Teaching

The distinction between memory and value is not made clear in Socratic teaching, nor does Socrates explain what he thinks memory is or how

he evaluates it. This seems characteristic of his teaching in its entirety as Plato represents it. Socratic teaching is well known for several contradictions. Socrates frequently confuses us with the differences or seeming inconsistencies between his words and deeds. Sometimes we can see him as a politician (even the only true one), and at other times he is not a politician at all. Similarly he also appears as a teacher (the only true one) and sometimes not a teacher at all, knowing something on the one hand (as the only one who knows anything at all) and knowing nothing at all. Most scholars interpret these contradictions as a consequence of the Socratic use of irony, a characteristic and an indispensable component of his way of teaching.³

Generally speaking, Socratic irony consists of giving a dual meaning to a key word in an argument. For example, Socrates consistently uses two different meanings for the notion of knowledge. The first is a boundless godlike knowledge; the second is a more restricted (conditional) human knowledge. Thus, in showing that he possesses some knowledge while constantly emphasizing that he knows nothing, Socrates is not being inconsistent. He simply does not explain which kind of knowledge he has in mind. For Socrates, there is no point in being clear because clarity can only be found deep in the soul, never just through the language of explanation. Instead he uses irony to access this clarity, which is a state he calls *arête* (virtue), or *sophrosyne* (a term difficult to express in English, but, roughly, moral sanity, rational control, moderation, or knowledge). As I will try to make clear later, this state is a consequence of a special training of our memory, or the way we memorize things.

The contradictory quality of Socrates' possession of knowledge and his status as a teacher is also present in his relationship to memory. He appears to have both an extremely weak and extremely strong memory. He always forgets what was said just a moment ago and asks people to remind him. At the same time, he remembers very distinctly the whole structure of an argument, and its key points. He forgets about ordinary things very easily, but remembers distinctly his duties towards philosophy and truth. He praises the value of memory for the philosopher, but at the same time is famous for spectacular cases of forgetfulness (in Plato's *Symposium*, for example, where Socrates, deep in philosophical meditation, forgets his destination).⁴ We are told in the *Symposium* that 'this is a habit of his – he goes off and stands wherever he happens to be.'⁵ We can also see Socrates praising the value of forgetfulness within philosophical practice. In the *Phaedrus*, for example, he praises different

kinds of divine madness that he understands as versions of forgetfulness, while silently attributing these states to philosophy.⁶ In *Laws*, Plato practically starts a whole argument about the ideal state with a praise of wine, because of its capacity to produce forgetfulness.⁷ According to Socrates, it is thanks to wine that people can forget things in a given moment that they are supposed to forget.

3. Memory, Knowledge, and Virtue

The problem of memory in Socratic teaching is strictly connected to his conception of knowledge in general. However, since knowledge, according to him, constitutes a definiens of virtue, which is the main subject of his teaching, we can say the concepts of virtue and teaching are also connected to memory. In ancient Greece, memory constitutes the very core of knowledge. To discuss memory is, then, to discuss knowledge itself. A famous story told in Plato's *Phaedrus* clearly represents this relationship between memory and knowledge.⁸ This is a story about the invention of writing, or, more precisely, about the disadvantages of written language. An Egyptian god Theuth (known to the Greeks as Hermes), the inventor of the alphabet, presents his invention to the Egyptian king Thamus. While Theuth proudly states that his discovery 'will make the people of Egypt wiser and improve their memories' and that it 'provides a recipe for memory and wisdom,'⁹ Thamus becomes suspicious. The king's main argument rests on showing that a written language will threaten the human ability to remember. He believes that human beings would no longer be willing to exercise their memory if they can instead have everything written down. Thus, King Thamus argues: 'If men learn this, it will implant forgetfulness in their souls: they will cease to exercise memory because they rely on that which is written, calling things to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks; what you have discovered is a recipe not for memory, but for reminder.'¹⁰ There is an interesting connection of this story to our modern technologies of storing memory and knowledge such as archives, documents, photo albums, films, etc. These technologies might all provoke the Platonic question: How do they affect our memory?

Plato does not equate knowledge with all forms of memory. He does not argue that the more we remember, the more profound our knowledge will be. Instead, he treats the concept of memory ironically by stressing its importance and trivializing it at the same time. This ironic

treatment is expressed in the very structure of *Phaedrus*, where the whole discussion rests on undermining the value of Phaedrus's exercises in the literal memorization of Lizeas's speech on the nature of love. According to Plato, knowledge is only memory in a specific modus or constellation. Thus, for Phaedrus, it is not knowledge that he is able to memorize a speech given by Lizeas the day before;¹¹ nor is it knowledge for the cave prisoners (in the story told in *The Republic*, book VII) that they, more or less clearly, remember shadows cast on the wall;¹² nor is it knowledge for *Ion* that he remembers perfectly extensive parts of the *Iliad*.¹³

In *Theatetus*, Plato twice defines knowledge using the notion of memory. The first time he defines it using the metaphor of 'memory as a wax tablet'.¹⁴ According to Cornford's comment on this passage, there exist two conditions for knowing something: 'I know a thing when I have had direct acquaintance with it and [an] image of it remains stored in my memory.'¹⁵ Thus knowledge, we can say, consists of clear perception and a kind of storage or, using a more contemporary computer metaphor, a kind of hard disk. Plato also uses the metaphor of 'memory as an aviary',¹⁶ by explaining that 'every mind contains a kind of aviary stocked with birds of every sort.'¹⁷ Here, knowledge is a state of possessing ideas as 'pieces of knowledge'¹⁸ that are stocked in memory, but do not constitute knowledge unless taken together in combination. According to Cornford, the metaphor of memory as an aviary is a basis for Plato's critique of the Sophists' notion of knowledge and teaching, as well as an introduction to the concept of recollection presented later in *Meno* and *Phaedo*.¹⁹ Using the computer metaphor one more time, we can say that the metaphor of memory as aviary corresponds to the notion of a hard disk without any complex operating system.

In Socrates' lifetime and long before him, education depended on the use of memory. Objects of memorization used for teaching were often Homeric poems or similar forms of verse, and moral standards conveyed in traditional dictums.²⁰ In the Sophists' teaching, speeches and rhetorical techniques took precedence over poetry.²¹ However, from Plato's *Hippias Major*, we know that the sophist, Hippias, is also ready to teach and require memorization of the following topics: astronomy, geometry, arithmetic, grammar, rhythm, music, genealogy, mythology, and history.²² It is worth noting that Hippias is depicted as famous for being a man of extraordinarily good memory who is able to retain a list of fifty names after a single hearing.²³ Socrates challenges traditional teaching strategies as well as the Sophists' understanding of the value

of remembering, calling into question the way memory is commonly used in education. A distinctive feature of his teaching is his call to do away with the reliance on memorization as a sufficient basis for knowledge. Plato seems to be suggesting that knowledge consists of some kinds of memory work, but not just of memorization.

While developing his own concept of teaching, Socrates also introduces new concepts of knowledge, memory, and virtue. These four notions are strictly connected in his philosophy, and are practically impossible to understand separately. Only their fusion produces the specific complex of Socratic ethical intellectualism.

4. Ethical Intellectualism

The basis for Socratic ethical intellectualism is the thesis that in order to be good, it is enough to know what goodness really is. If someone does wrong, it must either be a consequence of his lack of knowledge or of his insanity. Very subtle conceptualizations of knowledge and memory underlie this argument. Socrates' main thesis is that all human acts follow from knowledge and from nothing else, and this knowledge emerges from values. Only the characteristics of this knowledge explain human behaviour. If you want to improve someone's behaviour, you have to first improve his or her knowledge. What is critical to understanding this notion of knowledge is that it is not a purely intellectual experience but rather a way of being. Knowledge resides in a person's whole existence, and intellect or reasoning is only a tool used to improve it. Socratic teaching endeavours to change the pupil's way of being through a conversion of his soul.²⁴ Pierre Hadot calls this practice a *psychagogy*.²⁵ Addressing this tradition in philosophy, Michel Foucault stresses asceticism as its main condition, which includes work on one's own memory with an emphasis on changing it.

According to Socrates, knowing means being; to know goodness means to be good. No other way of knowing and teaching exists. Thus, we can understand the distinction made by Plato between having knowledge and possessing knowledge. Plato represents the notion of memory through the metaphor of an aviary to illustrate that there are two ways of storing knowledge as memory: having and possessing. Socrates states that 'if a man has bought a coat and owns it, but is not wearing it, we should say he possesses it without having it about him.'²⁶ 'Having' is then connected with being, and 'possessing' is connected with intellectual handling. Thus, 'having' is a special modus of

remembering, and we can call it the 'wearing' of memory, since the Greek word *echein* ('εχειν) was commonly used in reference to wearing a garment. The problem is that most people only possess knowledge about goodness without having it about them or wearing it.

5. Practising Memory

Plato's writings contain several distinct insights into the phenomenon of memory. Some of them strictly address the practice of Socrates' teaching, while others also discuss the Platonic 'second sailing' introduced in *Phaedo*.²⁷ In many instances, Plato discusses memory without making his own perspective of the notion clear. We can call it irony, that is, a conscious interplay with readers aimed not at confusing them but rather, as Szlezák puts it, at stimulating them. This interplay alone can teach us an important lesson about memory – it partly explains why it is important and why, at the same time, it is not so important.

The very construction of the *Symposium* is a good example here. The construction of its text is mnemonic to its very core. It is a story about a recollection of an event, a party at Agathon's house, told to us by Appolodorus. The account of the event seems kind of strangely told. First, Appolodorus wasn't present at the actual party,²⁸ so he cannot be a direct witness. Second, the actual party took place about fourteen years ago,²⁹ so it cannot be recollected precisely. Third, Appolodorus didn't even hear the story directly from Socrates but from one of his 'most ardent lovers at the time,' Aristodemus of Cydathenaeum, who only checked 'some details with Socrates.'³⁰ As a result, the whole story is disturbed by Aristodemus's passion. Fourth, the account that is given is a version told to a group of 'rich businessmen,' and Appolodorus's awareness of this audience influences the way the story is told.³¹ For example, more subtle insights are deleted. Fifth, Appolodorus also starts off by offending his audience, which is a pretext to remind us that his nickname is 'Maniac.' Thus, both he and Aristodemus are represented as passionate narrators who have the capacity to distort the story told. Sixth, Aristodemus cannot remember every speech in detail³² and even skips several speeches that he has difficulty remembering.³³ This makes the form of the story fragmented and only partial. Seventh, Socrates' speech within the story is a recollection within both Aristodemus's and Appolodorus's recollections about an even earlier happening: a conversation with Diotyma about love. As Socrates informs us, he doesn't even understand everything she told him.³⁴

To approach Plato's notion of memory, substituting the term 'story' for the term 'memory' is useful. The idea of divine madness in relation to memory is also significant throughout the *Symposium*. What Appolodorus and Socrates have in common is a passion, verging on madness, for philosophy. We are told that this mania is only a form of devotion.³⁵ It also bears a specific connection to remembering and forgetting. Both Appolodorus and Socrates are ready to remember and repeat stories, and this stems from their mania. But their stories seem to lack clarity. They are not directly witnessed or precise enough. They are fragmented, shaped and even distorted according to audience profile and the emotional state of the storytellers. As a result of these contingencies, the stories are changed constantly in the process of memorizing and re-memorizing. The Socratic word for this reshaping, also found in the epigraph to this paper, is 'practising.' Thus, forgetting is also a form of practising memory. It is interwoven throughout these stories and it is often related to mania. Socratic storytelling is just the other side of Socratic memory shaping. In Plato's *Phaedrus*, when Socrates meets Phaedrus, he asks him to tell a story of love. Daimonion reveals that Phaedrus's story contains error. It is too closely tied to the memory of Lizeas's story about the same topic. There is no critical distance. So Socrates tries to tell the story, practising his memory work, and reshapes it in accordance with something that is not exactly present in any memory – the real value of love.

The relationships between memory, knowledge, and love in Plato's writings are particularly complex. He is always trying to grasp what love is in his texts, and yet love is always disturbing the process of this grasping. This is because of a very literal understanding of philosophy (love of knowledge) in his tradition.

Our memory, knowledge, and, as we see later, identity are always combinations of two elements. One is the flux of memory, which the image of the aviary addresses: all we have experienced and been told about. This kind of memory is like the shadows in a Platonic cave. The second element is the ideal world of truth, which is static. In presenting these two different states of understanding, the construction of the *Symposium* reflects a fundamental quality in all of Plato's writings. Modern commentators point out that Socratic philosophy is always located somewhere between ideal truth and an empirically blurred image and is constantly clarifying ways to distinguish between opinion and wisdom.³⁶ As Gerald Mara explains, philosophy needs opinion, as well as the ideals of truth and wisdom, because it is constructed out of

personal memory, both rooted in the process of recollection and part of its flux. Opinion is similar to knowledge as blurred images collected empirically through experience and those moving shadows on the wall of a Platonic cave. Using Socrates' dialectic of memory work, we need to 'practise' the formation of opinions along with ideals of truth and wisdom. But this practising means changing or adapting the content and process of what we practise. As Mara explains: 'Even if there has been a historical Socratic conversation with someone named Diotyma, Socrates is not simply repeating her *logos* but changing it or adapting it in appropriate ways.'³⁷

Thus, the relation between memory and knowledge grows more complex. All we can know is rooted in our individual memory, which is always to a certain extent a blurred image. As Henri Bergson underlines much later, everything we perceive directly is also pervaded with the substance of memory. So, by taking the two notions of memory in *Theatetus*, we see that knowledge is the consequence of a constant interplay between clear perception (which is in fact never clear but pervaded with images from memory) and memory (which is always affected by new experiences, some of them 'maniac' experiences). Does practising memory allow for a way out of this weird and confusing feedback relation by adding a third element of knowledge?

6. Memory Affected by Value or the Three Rooms of Memory

The practice of philosophy in the Socratic tradition appears here as a reshaping of the content or form of personal memory. This is exactly the difference between Socrates and the sophists, as we see in *Phaedrus*, where the whole story rests on a speech by Phaedrus. Whereas Phaedrus's speech is an exact reconstruction or memorization of Lizeas's speech that he heard the day before, Socrates constructs his speeches spontaneously, according to his revelation of the truth about values, on the one hand, and his own previous experience or memory, on the other.

In Socratic teaching, the main goal of this reshaping is the recognition of values. Socrates is continually reconstructing his pupil's knowledge/memory in order to make that pupil 'wear' values, that is, to move from the stage of possessing knowledge about values to the stage of having this knowledge. However, most importantly, our knowledge/memory is always affected/constructed by experiencing values, according to Socrates. What we 'wear,' in fact, is always a consequence of our right or wrong recognition of values.

The core of Socratic teaching consists of the understanding that the recognition of values, found through memory, constitutes who we really are. All human deeds and behaviour stem from this recognition. Knowledge about values that construct the human condition is directly related to recollection in two of Plato's texts. From *Meno*, we know that people possess some essential prenatal knowledge or memory about value.³⁸ Moreover, from *Phaedrus*, we know that this essential memory constitutes the human condition or potential.³⁹ However, we can say that the very core of Socratic teaching already consists of the concept that the recognition (memory) of value constitutes who we really are. All human deeds and behaviour stem from this recognition. Socrates' aim is to change and reshape this recognition by 'exchanging a garment we are already wearing.' From this point of view, philosophical madness as devotion, which Socrates seems to experience, can be understood as a readiness to forget or weaken our previous memorization or order to make way for new revelations and understandings about values.

To explain this process, we can use the metaphor of the three rooms of memory. The first room is prenatal memory (abstract shapes/notions, on the one hand, and intuition of truth/value, on the other hand); the second room is possessed memory (the aviary); the third room is the memory that we have/are (the wax imprint of memory, also based on intuition of value). We are hereby joining the metaphor of the wax tablet with the concept of 'having knowledge,' based on Plato's insinuation that this type of memory is rooted in the heart.⁴⁰ This same idea is preserved later in Stoic tradition, as it places the thought process in the heart.⁴¹ This is why Socrates and Stoics alike had no problem with taking as a given that proper emotional balance stems from proper thinking, or even that these two things are basically the same. In the process of teaching, Socrates reformats the very structure of memory by exchanging the contents in the individual rooms of memory – moving ideas from room to room. This process of reformatting means that he catches some ideas and memories from the aviary, by evoking some shapes from prenatal memory, and imprinting them on his pupils' hearts. Therefore, these ideas are always on a personal level. Socrates never tells the pupil what truth is but instead pulls it out of the pupil, because truth is the shape of knowledge, not its content. Prenatal memory gives us this shape, while life gives us the content – but it is the content of the aviary, disordered, or ordered in inappropriate ways. What we need is an order that grasps the original shape. Philosophical

madness is a readiness to destroy inappropriate orders, which are always based on false evaluation, and exchange them for the proper shape.

However, this process of reshaping memory is not forced on the pupil, because Socrates believes values, seen clearly, imprint themselves in our heart without any coercion. Thus, strictly speaking, values reshape (rather than teach) our memory, and Socrates' job consists only of presenting them clearly on the field of our previous experiences, or of exposing our heart to the imprint of values. According to Socrates, then, the way to teach/memorize values is just to present them as clearly as possible. The level of clarity depends on the pupil's potential (i.e., on the shape of his prenatal memory). Thus, philosophy is the search for values by way of discussion.

7. Practising Memory by Reshaping It

Plato's *Philebus* helps to complete an understanding of the practice of memory in Socrates' teaching by revealing the mnemonic aspect of his ethical intellectualism. *Philebus* is a dialogue concerning the notion of pleasure. In its process of argumentation, we can find Plato's profound insight into the way memory works.⁴² His main thesis is that pleasure is not the main motive for human action. Rather, memory motivates us, because what and how we remember matters most. All motives related to the search and desire for pleasure are located in memory. There are false and weak pleasures as well as true and valid pleasures. Our memories of pleasurable experiences are based on our evaluation of a pleasure. Ultimately it is an evaluation and recognition of value that motivates our actions. These evaluations are produced through a spiritual nature in human beings, which is developed and made healthy by recognition of true value.

So, it is not actual pleasure that shows the way to our future activities, but our evaluation of pleasure. If you kiss a beautiful girl one evening, you will probably remember it as a good, pleasurable experience worth striving for in following evenings. But if, for some reason, you find (or are convinced) this was a bad pleasure, you will not strive for it in following evenings. A characteristic of Socrates' theory is that only the recognition of value makes you feel/remember pleasure in something. If you find, deep in your heart, what is good for you, you will follow it. But you cannot find it out of the blue, in some theoretical, abstract way. You need to find it in your previous pleasurable experiences.

According to Socrates, then, evaluation is always at the base of our memories of pleasure and joy. The pleasures of life are in Heraclitean flux. We need to order them, and thus our memories are structured according to an evaluative order. To change someone's behaviour, which is a goal of education, you only need to restructure their memory of previous pleasures and other experiences. To depict this process, the metaphor of shifting between the rooms of memory is useful because we restructure and recombine memories by changing the evaluations encoded within them. This practice is always based on the concept and recognition of human nature or the ideal of human life we are aiming for. If you are thoroughly convinced in your heart of what this human nature or ideal is, such recognition will change your whole behaviour because you will change the way you remember your previous pleasures accordingly. As your evaluation of the past changes, memories move from one room to another. Foucault finds a correlation here between Stoic teaching, based on Socratic tradition, and the Freudian concept of a 'watchman.' In the Stoic tradition, as he puts it, moral consciousness is the watchman of perceptions, preventing false attachments. Moral consciousness as watchman prevents inappropriate perceptions and memories from entering our room of the wax tablet. Foucault finds a Freudian analogy here, in the watchman that is present between subconscious and conscious memory. The main difference between the Socratic-Stoic tradition and Freud's theory is an association of the identity of our personal agency, or, at least, the very essence of our agency, with the watchman in the former.

A characteristic of Socratic practice, then, is its focus on memory and, through discussion, changing the way we remember experiences one by one, by recognizing a greater value in some while devaluing others. Socrates engages in this process during his conversation with Polos and Kallikles in *Gorgias*, as he tries to lessen, step by step, their perceptions of pure exertion of political power as good.

As a consequence of Socratic practice, a pupil should be left with the same content of memory as aviary, but reordered and evaluated differently on the wax tablet, according to an ideal shape that corresponds to prenatal memory. The recognition of value is not some new memory of an object or experience added to our aviary. It is the repositioning and shifting to the wax tablet of memories we already have. This practice is a like making one big picture out of many smaller pictures. This big picture is one we all have, according to Plato, embedded in our prenatal memory. In Socratic tradition, it is some kind of intuition of truth. The

small pictures are all our personal memories. All we need is to have them ordered properly. We can also approach this through the metaphor of a flavour. It is possible to reach the same taste with slightly different ingredients. Similarly, every personal memory has different ingredients – the truth in this context is the taste that is the goal of reconstructing the value proportions between the given ingredients. Taste, then, is a metaphor for the form of our memory and different ingredients of the actual memories we possess. All that matters are proportions.

As we stressed before, according to many modern interpretations of Plato, knowledge (as a specific construction of our memory) that is reachable by human agency is something in between an ideal unchanging world of truth and a constant flux of immediate experiences. Experiences are always new and different, and this forces us to constantly rework or practise our memories. As in the epigraph of this paper, Socrates is always practising both his pupils' memories and his own, in order to reach a shape of memory made out of the sum of actual experiences that resembles truth as much as possible.

NOTES

- 1 Plato, *Symposium*, in *The Symposium and The Phaedo*, trans. R. Larson (Arlington Heights, IL: AHM Publishing Corporation, 1980), 172a.
- 2 Sigmund Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, ed. and trans. James Strachey (London: Penguin Books, 1973).
- 3 Gregory Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*. (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 21–44, 132–56.
- 4 Plato, *Symposium*, 174d–175c.
- 5 *Ibid.*, 175b.
- 6 Plato, *Phaedrus*, trans. J.C.B. Gosling (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 243e–245c, 249d–257a.
- 7 Plato, *Laws*, in *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 4, trans. B. Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), Book I-II.
- 8 Plato, *Phaedrus*, 274b–278b.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 274e.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 275a.
- 11 *Ibid.*, 228a–c.
- 12 Plato, *The Republic*, trans. Dermond Lee (London and New York: Penguin, 2003), 516d.

- 13 Plato, *Ion*, trans. Walter Hamilton and Chris Emlyn-Jones (London: Penguin, 1997), 536d–537e.
- 14 Plato, *Theatetus*, trans. John McDowell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 190e–195b.
- 15 F.M. Cornford. *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (New York: Liberal Art Press, 1957), 121.
- 16 Plato, *Theatetus*, 197b–199c.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 197d.
- 18 *Ibid.*, 199b
- 19 Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, 135–6.
- 20 Werner Wilhelm Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, Vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945).
- 21 W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol III: The Fifth Century Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 41–4.
- 22 Plato, *Hippias Major*, in *Early Socratic Dialogues*, trans. Robin Waterfield (London: Penguin, 1987), 285c–e.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 285e.
- 24 See Thomas Alexander Szlezák, *Reading Plato*, trans. G. Zanker (London and New York: Routledge, 1999); Michael Miller, *Plato's Parmenides: The Conversion of the Soul* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
- 25 Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford and New York: Blackwell, 1995).
- 26 Plato, *Theatetus*, 197b.
- 27 Plato, *Phaedo*, in *The Symposium and The Phaedo*, 97b–100b.
- 28 Plato, *Symposium*, in *The Symposium and The Phaedo*, 172b–c.
- 29 *Ibid.*, 173a.
- 30 *Ibid.*, 173b.
- 31 *Ibid.*, 173c.
- 32 *Ibid.*, 178a.
- 33 *Ibid.*, 180c.
- 34 *Ibid.*, 210a.
- 35 *Ibid.*, 173d.
- 36 Gerald M. Mara, *Socrates' Discursive Democracy: Logos and Ergon in Platonic Political Philosophy* (New York: New York State University Press, 1997), 148–85.
- 37 *Ibid.*, 200.
- 38 Plato, *Meno*, in *Protagoras and Meno*, trans. A. Beresford (London and New York: Penguin, 2005), 81a–85d.
- 39 Plato, *Phaedrus*, 248c–249d.

- 40 Plato, *Theatetus*, 194c-d; John Issac Beare, *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcmaeon to Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), 267.
- 41 Margaret E. Reesor, *The Nature of Man in Early Stoic Philosophy* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1989), 2.
- 42 Plato, *Philebus*, trans. J.C.B. Gosling (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 33c–37b.